AdvaitaSiddhi – Lecture 13 – Part 2

Na cha asatiativyapti,

Just because, the eternal non-existence of something is being discussed, one should not levy a charge of ativyapti against the Advaitin. Why? The revered author clarifies this:


It is not  that here the knowledge takes place without any corresponding cognition(pratite) of existence.  In the definition we have to accept “sattwenpratitiarhatwa” as an adjective. Mithya objects unlike asat objects appear to be existent though they are actually adjuncts of absolute non-existence in their locus of appearance.

The dualist now raises a new objection:

Na chatadaiyke ahu asatevamidamagreasititishrutyaasatasattwapratitetatraativyaptidushpariharaitivachyam.

According to the follower of the Madhwa School, even addition of “satwenpartitiarhatwang”-that which appears to be existent, to the definition of revered Chitsulkhacharya does not solve the problem of a too broad definition (ativyapti). This is because shruti itself says “asatamidamagreasit”- prior to creation there was only non-existence (and that was cognizable). So even absolute non-existence can be cognized as existence and thus it cannot be meaning fully distinguished from mihyatwa. However,MadhusudanaSaraswatiji says- na cha vachyam-don’t say like this as it is not logical.

“sadevasouymyaidamagreasit” ityasyaarthasyaabhavaevananjpratipadiyatenatuasatasatyamvirodhat,

The shruti says itself that whatever exists is nothing but existence. So if the interpretation of the dualist is accepted then shruti would become contradictory. Thus “asat” in the first sentence quoted above does not imply absolute non-existecne but only apparent absence of Existence, and is thus equivalent to mithyatwa.

atonaativyaptisarvam cha nyatpurvauktamevaanusandhyemitiuparamyate.

Thus there is no ativyaptidosha. All other remaining doubts has been clarified in the second definition of falsity.[1]


Here ends the discussion on the fourth definition of falsity.

Sadviviktamvamithyatwam. Sattwang cha pramanasiddhatwam.Pramang cha doshasahakritajnankaranatwam,  tenswapnadivatpramanasiddhabhinatwammithyatwamsidhyati.

This is the fifth and the final definition of falsity.Sadviviktatwam-that which is different from sat is what is mithya. Here sat means that which is having sattwa(existence ness) and that is which is –pramanasiddhatwam. Nyayamritakara had given various definitions of sat in this context, and had refuted them. MadhusudanaSaraswatiji , does not accept any of those definitions and says that which is sat is –pramanasiddhatwam- that which is proved through pramanas. Pramana cha doshaasahakritamjnanakaranatwam- Pramana is that which is the means of knowledge and does not have any fault in them. So, that which is associated with error, like nidradoshha, cannot be a pramana, like the knowledge gained through dreams. So mithyatwa is doshasahakrita jnana karanatwam.

Pramanasiddhyatwam cha avadhyavypyamitianyat.

Moreover pramanasiddhyatwa is avadhyatwavapyam. Whatever is known by means of right knowledge  that has avadhyatwa- non-negtability.

Atrapiasatinirdharmakabrahmani cha ativyaptivaranayasattwenpratiyamanatwamvisheshanamdeyam, tayosattwaprkarakpratitivishyatwaabhavat.

Now Brahman does not have existence as attribute, but is nirdharmaka-without any attributes. So in that sense it is also satviviktwam and hence becomes mithya. Moreover asat-absolute non existence is also different from existence and thus would get incorporated within the category of mithyatwa. To remove Brahman and ast from the category of mithya, an adjective of “sattwenpratitiarhatwang” should be added to the definition  “sat viviktwam”. This is because there is no sattwapratitiprakara in Brahman and asat as they never appear to be sattwa.


Nyaymritakara asks in His text, that whetehr it has sattajati in the adhikarana that is being discussed, or  issatta that which is non-negatable, or is satta identical to Brahman.[2]

Adoughatadouavidyakjatiabhiyupagamenasambhava, dwitiyevadyatwarupamithyatwaparyavasanamtriteyesiddhasadhanamitinirastam

In pot etc it is accepted, that the class that exists is avidyaka-jati-a class characterised by avidya. So here sattwajati cannot be there. However, this argument is not correct. It is not because of the pot existence is there, but it is on Existence the pot has been superimposed[3]. The second point was avadytwa-If one accepts satwa to be avadytwa, then finally it will be reduced to vadytwa, as jagat is mithya and hence vadya. If the third poition is accepted then there is siddhasadhanadosha as Brahman is already accepted to be different from jagat.


So all these three positions are not accepted by Advaitins but pramnasiddhatwam is accepted to be definition of the falsity.


All the discussions that took place while analysing the first definition of falsity, sad-asadvilakshanatwam (not beng the locus of existence and non-existence) can be incorporated here to answer the relevant doubts raised by Nyayamritakara. If some doubt still persists, those will be clarified (MadhusudanaSaraswatiji says) on the chapter on drishtanta-the example.

Here ends the discussion on the fifth definition of falsity.

In the text called Shatadushani, seven definitions for falsity/mithyatwa was chosen and all of them were condemned. Among them only five definitions of falsity that have been discussed above are considered to be error free by the knowers of tradition.



[1] Since these definitions are very similar.

[2]Because Brahman is often referred as sat-chid-ananda.

[3] In advaita Vedanta existence is not simply an attribute.



PancaMithyatve (the five definitions of Mithya-ness) my Dream / Pet project written by Shri Rajit Biswas  who wrote these  after listening the Lectures comes to an end.



Categories: AdvaitaSiddhi, Vedanta | Comments Off on AdvaitaSiddhi – Lecture 13 – Part 2

AdvaitaSiddhi – Lecture 13 – Part 1

Swaashrayanisthaatyantaabhavapratiyogitwangvamithyatwam. Tad cha swatantraabhavadhikaraneevapratiyamanatwamatahapurvavailakshanyamdushanapariharapurvavat.

Swaashraya- by the word “swa” whatever is to be proven should be accepted. Thus swa here means mithyatwa. Thus swaashraya- means mithyatwaashraya. Nistha- in that locus (adhikarna), the place, where mithya exists.Atyantaabhavapratiyogitwang-  adjunct of eternal absence. Now, atyantaabhava( eternal absence) and traikaliknishedpratiyogitwang (absence in all the three periods of time) (from the second definition of falsity) are very similar.Swaashrayanistha (the place/locus of existence of the mithya object) and pratipannaupapadou (jnatedharmine)(second definition of falsity) are very similar.So it may seem that the reference is being made by the revered author once more to the second definition of falsity. This is called dosha (error) called punaruktidosha( error of repetition). Instead of presenting it here, this definition of falsity should have been discussed with second definition of falsity. If such a doubt is raised, MadhusudanaSaraswatiji says there is no such error. The difference between the two definitions is that in this definition of falsity, swatantraabhavadhikaraneevapratiyamanatwam – the locus of the eternal  absence is incorporated into the definition and thus it is different from the earlier one.  All the contradictions and objections that can be raised are also more or less same to the second definition of falsity and can be rejected in a similar fashion.

Na cha samyoginisamavayinivadeshe tad atyantaabhavasambhavaasambhavetuupadantwaanupapattiitivachyam,

A very interesting objection is raised by the dualist here. While discussing the second definition of falsity, the logicians had tried to show that in the same place samyoga and samavaya relationship can be there, and the same object can be existent and non existent in the same locus through different relations(samyoga and samavaya). On the other hand, by the same relation the object can be existent in one part of the locus and absent in the other. However, while the relevant discussion took place MadhusudanaSaraswatiji, negated those ideas and proved that what actually is being proved in all those places is the existence and non existence of the relationship. Here the dualist is raising a slightly different objection.A pot exists on a table/ground through samyoga (conjunction) relationship. In that locus of existence, the eternal absence of pot-atyantaabahva can never be proved. The pot exists in the pot-sherds by samvaya (inherent) relationship. In that locus also the eternal absence of pot can be never proven. If eternal absence of pot is shown in the potsherds, then being the locus of eternal absence of pot, they can never be the cause of pot, which is absurd. The contention of the dualist is this: whatever be the relationship, samyoga or samvaya, the existence of an object can never be negated in the locus. In order to refute this MadhusudanaSaraswatiji says na cha vachyam.

kalesahasambhavatdesheapisahasambhavaavirodhatpragbhavsatwenupadantwavirodhat cha.

Through the relationship of time, both prior absence-pragabhava and eternal[1] absence –atyantaabahva can be there.  Therefore it can exist through the relationship of space also. Pragabhavasatwenupadanavirodhat cha- however, if there is eternal absence it can’t be material cause. Thus in case of pot sherds they can never be the cause for pot. This problem is avoided by the fact that pragabhava is also posited to be there and that prior absence can be the cause of this pot.

Na cha atyantaabhavaadhikaranepragabhavasyaapianupapattiitivachyam

The dualist tries to bring in a rule that wherever there is pragabhava(prior absence), there is no atyanatabhava(eternal absence) and wherever there is atyantaabhava there is no pragabhava. However MadhusudanaSaraswatiji sys that there is no such rule and thus says na cha vachyam

Kale vyabhicharat

This is because, through time eternal absence and prior absence can co-exist (see footnote 1) and the rule established by the dualist is negated – vyabhicharat.

Na cha kale pragabhavaatyantaabhavayosamanadhikaranamidaningghataatyantaabhavaidanngghatapragbhavaitipratitevalatangikritat

The dualist argues that in time both pragabhava and atyantaabahva can be shown to be existing because of direct perception- pratitevalatangikritat. However,

Deshetu tad ubhaysamanadhikaranyenakinchidapipraanamitivachyam

That prior absence and eternal absence can exist in the same space, is not validated by  any means of right knowledge. At least there is pramana for prior absence and eternal absence to exist in the same time by virtue of one’s perception but not for space. However this is refuted by the revered author in the following way:


The knowledge gained through mithyatwaanumana and shruti itself is the pramana. Swaahshrayanistha-This term indicates that there is atyantaabhava in the locus of the object, and thus even in pragabhava that can persist. Moreover the shrutisays’nehananastikinchan”-nothing exist except self.


The only rule is that bhava (existence) and abhava (non-existence) should exist in different planes of reality.

[1] Consider that there a few pot sherds which can be used to make a pot, but the pot still has not been made. So both eternal absence and  prior absence of pot is there. Once the pot is made, these absences are negated. Thus anything that is created has a relationship with time and through that relationship with time both types of absence can persist in the locus.

Categories: AdvaitaSiddhi, Vedanta | Comments Off on AdvaitaSiddhi – Lecture 13 – Part 1

AdvaitaSiddhi – Lecture 12

Na jnanaprayuktaavasthithisamanyavirahapratiyogitwang hi jnananivartatwam

In order to refute the arguments of the Madhvas, MadhusudanaSaraswatiji  explains “jnananivartatwa”. Jnanaprayukta means the application of knowledge, avasthithi means state of existence, samnayaviraha means general absence, pratiyogi means adjunct. So jnananivartam means through the application of knowledge, the state of general existence is negated and it becomes the adjunct of general absence. If the term “jnananivartam” is accepted in this way, then there is no error in the definition.

avasthischdwedhaswarupenkaranatmana cha

Avasthithi or existence is of two types. One is it on nature-swarupen and the other is its casual state-karanatmana. According to sankhya and advaita Vedanta, the effect remains in a latent state in the cause, even before creation.


This is called satkaryavada. According to this view all creation is simply manifestation. So when the pot is of the clay it is karanatma

tatha cha mudgarpatenghatsyasarupenavashtivirahaapikaranatmanaavasthithivirahabhavat

So when the stick and stone destroys the pot, though its form is destroyed the pot exists in its causal state as potsherds or  clay. So, total sublation does not take place, as is true for mithya objects which are completely sublated by knowledge.


The causal state of an effect can never be sublated by any other means except through brahmajnana.  So no error of ativyapti exists here.


In the same way, there is no siddhasadhanadosha, in the case of purvajnana which gets  terminated by uttarjnana. This is because just as in the previous case, the purvajnana remains in its causal state.

n ava viyadadoubrahmajnannashyatweapitadvadevmithyatwasidhyaarthantaramuttarjnanenlinasyapurvajnasyswakaranatmanaavasthanatavasthithisamanyavirahaanupapatti

No charge of arthantarata (proving something not intended) should be brought against this definition of falsity from the perspective of space etc. Space can be only be negated through Brahman-jnana and nothing else. Through the uttarjnana the purvajnana has been negated, but still the purvajnana is not totally destroyed. Purvajnana (like that of a pot) leaves athought imprint, samaskara, that thought imprint indicates that the purvajnana exists in the casual stae. The revered author thus says,avasthithisamanyavirahaanupapatti- no absolute absence can thus be invoked (except through brahmajnana).


However, a doubt may be raised whether mithyatwalakshana would incorporate asat objects like sasha-vishana-hare’s horn within itself. This is because avisthisamnyaviraha-genral absence of existence is there (both in causal and manifested state). Thus one may have a doubt of ativyaptidosha here. But, MadhusudanaSaraswatiji negates this by saying that there is no jnanaprayuktatwa here-one does not have to apply knowledge to understand the non existence involved innhare’s horn, whil knowledge of locus is required to understand the non existence of mithya objects.


Sadhyavikalatadosha is not applicable here. On the mother of pearl, the illusion of silver is created. There exists an arthakriyakaritwaa –transactional ability in that silver, and so one has to accept the existence of silver, when it is being perceived-pratitikale. The vyavaharika silver is the cause which causes its desire and prods people to rush for it. So, until there is vadhakjnana there is an apparent existence of silver, and without that vadhakjnana this silver cannot be negated. However, in case of hare’s horn here is total absence and we do not need vadhakjnana for it. Thus, no sahyavikalatadosha exists here.

AtaevauktangVivaranacharyai- “ajnasyaswakaryenpravilinenvartamanenvasahajnanennivrittivadha” iti.

In this context revered Vivaranacharya, says what is badha-sublation. Ajnansyaswkaryensaha- when ajnana along with its effects that exists pravilinen- in the past, vartamanen-present and future (vartamana here is to be understood to indicate present and future) gets eradicated, then it is called vadha.

This is also supported by Sureshwaracharya:


Through the mahavakyas like tatwamasi , the right knowledge that takes place  destroys instantly (at the same moment) avidya and its effects that exists in all the three periods of time.

“sahakaryennaasit” itilinenekaryenshanivrittiabhiprayem; “sakaryennabhavishiyati” ititubhavikaryanivrittiabhiprayem, itianyatatet. Rupyaupadanamajnanenswakaryenvartamanen linen vas aha adhisthansakshatkaratnivartate.

“sahakaryennaasit” the present knowledge after it dawns eradicate the ignorance that exits not only in the present, but also erradicatdsthe ignorance of the past. “sahakaryennabhavishiyati” it also eradicates the future karya of ignorance. (Basically past present and future are all imagined through ignorance). This can be explained through an example. The karya of ajnana is the silver superimposed. The superimposed silver that exists in all the three periods of time gets eliminated when there is adhisthansakshatkara-knowledge of the locus-mother of pearl.

Tattwarupyaupadanamajnananangbhedabhyupagamatitinadrishtantesadhyavaikalyammudgarpatanantarangghatonastiitipratitivatadhisthanjnanatarangghatonastiitipratitivatadhisthanjnanantarangshuktyjnangtadgatrupang cha nastiitipratitesarvasammatwat.

Ajnana is negated by the immediate knowledge of adhisthana-this is what is accepted by the advaitin. This does not mean that knowledge of any particular locus like that of mother of peal would give realisation y destroying ignorance. Ignorance is accepted to be multiple. There is ignorance for pot, cloth etc. There is no trouble in the example of the nature of sadhyvaikalya. The knowledge should eradicate ignorance but for the same item ignorance can be many and so at the sameplace there can be ignorance.

After the pot is destroyed by a stick or stone, we have the cognition that there is no pot. Similarly when the knowledge of mother of pearl takes place, the cognition risesthat there is no silver. The advaitin accepts anirvachaniyakhyativada, while the logicians accept anyathakhyativada and others have their own khyativada. However, that the knowledge of locus implies the superimposition vanishes is accepted by all- sarvasammatam.

Jnantwavyapedharmenjnannivartwamitiapi sadhu.

Even if jnananivatawa is accepted asjnantwavyapyadharma then there is no error.

Uttarjnasyapurvajnannivartakatwangna cha jnatwavyapyadharmenkintuicchadisadharanenudichyatmaisheshagunatwenudichitwenvaitinasiddhasadhanadi.

The Madhvas had pointed out that jnantwavyapya dharma exists in  uttarjnana that negates the purvajnana. However, this is not true. There is no jnanatwavyapya dharma here, but the desire, hatred  which arises in the mind  (that prods us) as attributes of self that causes  the uttarjnana to negate the purvajnana.

Napiicchadinivartyasmritenajnannivartasamskareativyapti, smrittenasmritesamskaranivartakatwamanabhavat.smritou hi jatayangsamsakaradrirhabhavatiitianubhavasiddhamteyangdrirataratwang cha samanvishyaksamskaraankatwamitiadosha.

Now the dualist once again raises the issue of memory. Though it can be accepted that jnantwavyapya dharma is not  there in case  of uttarjnana but, according to the dualist it is definitely there in memory. Also it is accepted that smriti negates samaskaras. MadhusudanaSaraswatiji refutes this charge. Remembrance cannot be destructive of samaskaras. “Smriti  is that which negates samaskaras” – there are no means of right knowledge to prove this. However it is proved by our experience that smriti strengthens samaskaras (instead of destroying them). One actually strengthens one’s thought imprint by repeated knowledge which is memory. This is what He says-drirataratwang cha samanvishyaksamskaraankatwam.

Vastastusakshatkartwenjnannivartawangvivakshityamatanapurvaktadosha. Napinischayetwenjnatwavyapyadharmenjnnnivartasamsayaativyapti, itisarvamavadatm.

MadhusudanaSaraswatiji says that the whole point of this discussion was to refute the views of the dualist school. However, in actuality,what is accepted by jnananivartatwa is neither jnantwavyapya dharma or jnanatwen but only accept sakshatkaren-the knowledge of the locus. So say, in nischayajnana-determined knowledge there is a doubt. The doubt is negated by the strength of knowledge and not by sakshatkara -knowledge of the locus. So the definition does not unduly extend to doubt.


Here the discussion on the third definition of falsity ends.

The fourth definition of falsity is given by Chitsukhacharya. The fourth definition is very similar to the second definition. It may seem that only words have been changed, but that is not true.




Categories: AdvaitaSiddhi, Vedanta | Comments Off on AdvaitaSiddhi – Lecture 12