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Posted by on December 22, 2016

Chapter 1

  1. Condemning the acceptance of Pramana etc as part of dialog


àmana*_yupgmSy kwa¼Tvo{fnm!

Aw kwaya< vaidnae inymmeta†z< mNyNte – – àma[ady svRtÙisÏaNttya isÏa> pdawaR> sNtIit kwka_yam_yupeym!,

Supporting: The logician accepts the pramaana etc different substances as a necessary pre-requisite for any dialog. They say “since they are accepted by all the philosophies it should be accepted as part of the dialog”.

The pramaana etc are “pramaana-prameya-samshaya-prayojana-drshtaanta-siddhaanta-avayava-tarka-vaada-jalpa-vitandaa-hetvaabhaasa-chala-jaati-nigrahastaanaani shodasha padaartha:” (means of right knowledge, object of knowledge, doubt, result, example, conclusion, parts, logic, dialog to know, dialog to win, dialog to condemn, illogic, deceitful logic, self-contradictory, logical pitfalls are the sixteen substances).

There are three types of “katha” (dialog) which one can enter into:

  1. Vaada – A dialog between two people with the intent to know the truth.
  2. Jalpa – A dialog between two people with intent to defeat the other. Though the first and second type maybe similar in majority of the aspects, in the second, people resort to the “chala” (deceitful logic). An example for this type of deceit is, “nava kambalam aanaya” here in this statement nava may mean new or nine, so according to the opponents statement the meaning is changed to form the other, bring a new / nine blanket/s.
  3. Vitandaa – This is the form of dialog which resorts only to negating / refuting / condemning the opponents, and not proving anything. Though nyaya sutra bhashyakara (commentator) Sri Prasashtapada declares, even if the one doing vitandaa accepts his position of being a follower of vitandaa-vaada, he looses the dialog. But the later authors of logic and others accept, he may declare his intent / idea but should not follow it up by trying to prove it. This is what the author here does in many a place to show the standpoint of the Advaita.

There are four types of “siddhanta” (definite valid conclusion)

  1. Sarvatantra – If something is accepted universally by all the philosophies. For example, the object of knowledge is dependent upon the valid means.
  2. Pratitantra – Things which are exclusive for each of the philosophies.Lke thinks accepted in nyaya is not accepted in Vedanta and vive-versa.
  3. Adhikarana – If on proving something, something else is also proven. For example, while proving the knower to be different from the sense organ of sight and sense organ of hearing etc, we have established not only the knower, but also the existence of manifold sense-organs, and each one of them having different objects for its perception.
  4. Abhyupagama – When something not explicitly said is inferred. Lke the mind as a sense-organ.

From here the Opponent (in this case Vedanti) speaks

tdpre n ]mNte, twaih- àma[adIna< sÅv< yd_yupey< kwken tTkSy hetae>,

Refuting: The others (vedantins) do not accept this. They ask – the existence of pramana etc which is to be accepted, what is the reason for this?

From here the vedantins refute the idea of the logicians of accepting the pramana etc as the pre-requisite for the dialog.  In the next paragraph, the author gives four possible clauses for this.

ik< tdn_yupgCDÑ(a< vaidàitvaid_ya< td_yupgmsaihTyinytSy vaGVyvaharSy àvtRiytumzKyTvat!, %t kwka_ya< àvtRnIyvaGVyvhar< àit hetuTvat!, %t laekisÏTvat!, Awva tdn_yupgmSy tÅvinnRyivjy)l AitàsÃkTvat!,

Is it because 1. Both the parties in the dialog who do not accept it cannot possibly enter the verbal transaction which is based on (the concomitance of) its acceptance or 2. It is the cause for the verbal transaction in the dialog or. It is a established rule of the world or 4. Non acceptance of it will be a hindrance for deciding the conclusive knowledge or the victory.

The difference between the first and the second is the former is based on the concomitance and the later is based on the reason. The concomitance being, wherever there is acceptance of pramana etc there is verbal transaction.  In the latter, because there is pramana etc there is verbal transaction.

The worldly rule being, the pramana etc is accepted as the reason for the dialog.

All the four options are refuted one by one. First we take the first option – based on concomitance.

n tavda*>, tdn_yuPgCDtae=ip cavaRkmaXyimkadevaRiGvStr[a< àtIymanTvat!, tSyEv va=in:pÄaE ÉvtStiÚrasàyasanuppÄe>,

It cannot be the first, because even by the people like “charvaaka” (materialist), “maadhyamika” (Buddhist voidism) who do not accept it (pramaana etc) too are seen to elaborate (in dialog fashion). If that elaboration itself is not acceptable, then there no possibility of you putting great effort to negate it.

Chaarvaaka literally means one who speaks beautifully. But here in this context it is the materialist, people who accept the body / sense-organs as the Self. The do not accept any pramana except Pratyaksha (direct perception). Though so, they use inference to negate the others, like when they negate the mimamsakas (ritualist) ask, if you say the cow or any animal killed for the sake of the ritual reaches heaven, why not kill your father for the sake of the ritual, do you not want him to enjoy the pleasures of heaven.

Maadhyamika are people who follow the middle path. They do not accept any extremes of existence or non-existence, since everything is void in reality.

Thus if someone does not accept the pramana then it is easier to negate them by not entering into a dialog, and if a dialog is started to negate them, then as the dialog has started already, one should not stick to the rule of accepting the pramana etc for the dialog, as it stands vindicted.

sae=ympUvR> àmanaidsÅvan_yupgmaTma vaKStMÉnmÙae Évta=_yUiht> nUn< ySy àÉavat! Égvta surgué[a laekayitkain sUÇai[ n à[Itain twagten va mXymagma naepidòa> ÉgvTpaden va badara[Iye;u sUÇe;u Éa:y< naÉai;,

This is some unforeseen mantra you have devised for blocking the speech of the opponent of the form of acceptance of the existence of the pramaana etc. Because of its super power, Bhagavan Brihaspati has not written the sutras on the charvaka system, Bhagavan Buddha has not preached the system if middle path or did the Bhagavatpada Sri Shankaracharya writ the commentary on the sutras of Sri Badharayana.

Vaak-stambhana mantra – in the mantra shastra there are different methods of application according to the need prescribed, though it is negated for the real sadhaka (as the mantra becomes an enemy, and it makes him be associated with the kamya karmas (the karmas propelled by the desire)). They can be distinguished as sattvic, rajasic and tamasic  – the karmas like attraction (vashikarana) fall in the first, the karmas pertaining to creating of enmity (vidveshana) in the second and the karmas like stambhana and maarana (blocking and killing) fall in the third. Stambhana is also of different levels, blocking the body – from activity, speech from talking or the mind from thinking, these types of chants can be used to control the nature too. Here the logician’s acceptance is similar to – if you do not accept the pramaana etc as pre-requisite for dialog, then do not have the right to speak.

There is a general rule – “pramaanavanti adhrushtaani kalpyaani, bahuuniapi na nishpramaanaka” (one should imagine different effects with respect to the pramaana and not without a pramaana).

From nuunam author pulls the leg of the logician, by pointing out to the great people who have not though accepted this standpoint have written great works. Here, by referring to all these three schools, he is presenting them as the refuters.

àma[a*n_yupgMyaip àvtRyNtu nam te vacae ɼI> taStu saxnbxan]ma n ÉviNt tavtit cet!,

Supporting: let them do verbal transaction who speak beautifully (charvaka and Buddhist, even you vedanti) without accepting the pramana etc as the pre-requisite, but still their words wont have the ability ro establish or refute anything, if be said.

Sadhana-badhana-kshama – Sadhana-kshama is the ability to establish ones idea. Badhana–kshama  is the ability to refute the opponents idea. Thus, to be able to prove or win a dialog, you still have to accept the pramana etc as the pre-requisite.

n, àma[a*n_yupgMy àvitRtÅv< tdIysaxnbaxn]mtaya< n inyamkm!, ikNtu sÖcnaÉasl][yaeigTv< #TyvZym_yupey< Évta, yena_yupgMyaip àma[aid àvitRta mtaNtranusairiÉVyRvhara A_yupgt àma[aidsÅvE> mtaNtrVyvhairiÉrprErtwaÉUta #it kWyNte,

Refuting:  No. The verbal transaction accepting the pramaana etc is not the cause for its ability to prove or refute anything. But, even you should accept it as one that has in it the eligibility of being endowed with wrong logic. Thus, the verbal transaction accepting the pramaana etc belonging to a different school (mimamsa philosophy) is negated by the people who accept the pramaana etc in the verbal transaction (logicians).

Sad-vacana is the statement which has the right logic. And the contrary is the sad-vacana-aabhaasa – the statement which has seeming logic, and not right logic. This Sadvacana-aabhsasa can be understood in other words, as the statement which has hetvaabhaasa.

Here one school of logicians – nyayika condemn the other school of logicians – vaisheshika, too can be accepted.

yid TvSmÖis sÖcnaÉasl][< n Évan! dzRiytumIòe tda=n_yupgMy àma[adIin Évta àvitRtae=y< Vyvhar #it ztk«TvSTvya %Cymane=ip naSmakmadr>, ANywa A_yupgMy àm[adIin Évta àvitRtae=y< Vyvhar #Tyetavta ÉvdIy VyvharaÉas #TySmaiÉrip v´…< zKyte,

If you do not have the capability to show the illogic in our statement, then even if you repeat a hundred times that ‘you have entered the verbal transaction without accepting the pramaana etc (therefore it is illogical)’ we do not care. Otherwise, we can also say that ‘you have entered the verbal transaction accepting the pramaana etc’, therefore your statement too is illogical.

If we start negating something without resorting to logic, anything and everything can be negated. One may say buffalo is black; therefore buffalo’s milk is black too.

nnu yid àma[adIin n siNt tda Vyvhar @v xmIR kw< isÏ(et! Ë;naidVyvSwa va kw< Syat! svRivixin;exana< àma[axInTvat!,

Supprtive: But, if there are no pramaana etc (attributes) then how can therebe the existence of its attributed, the verbal transaction, or how can there be the existence of the negation etc, since all the injunction or negation are based (dependent) on the prmaana.

As said earlier, “manaadhiinaa meyasiddhi, maana siddhi ca lakshanaat” (the object is dependent on the means of right knowledge, and that in turn is dependent on the definition). If we do not accept the pramana, then there can be no object of knowledge like the injunction or negation are dependent on it. Injunction – existence, negation – absence.

mEvm!, n äUmae vy< n siNt àma[adIin #it SvIk«Ty kwa==r_yeit, ikÚam siNt n siNt va àma[adInITySya< icNtayamudasInE>, ywa SvIk«Ty tainVyvùyNte twa VyvhairiÉrev kwa àvTyRtam!,

Refutive: Not so. We do not say to start the verbal transaction accepting ‘pramaana etc do not exist’. Then what, we say without being bothered about the thought of the existence or non-existence of the pramaana etc. As you do the verbal transaction accepting it (pramaana etc), similarly we should start the verbal transaction in the dialog.

As we vedantins do not accept anything other than the Self to be eternal, we cannot accept the pramaana etc as eternal, but that does not mean we cannot accept the transactional reality (temporarily permanent status) still as the world etc is accepted to be pramaana, until there is the experience of the body-sense-organ complex or the non-experience of the Self.

[Paramartika – permanently permanent. Vyavaharika – temporarily permanent. Pratibhasika – temporarily temporary]

ANywa n siNt àma[adInIit mtmSmakmaraePy yidd< Évta Ë;nmu´< tdip v´…m! n zKym!,

Otherwise superimposing that ‘we (vedantin) do not accept the pramaana etc’, whatever defects you explained, that is impossible to say too.

Though we never said, we do not accept the existence of the pramana etc, the logician thought we think so. Thinking thus, he pointing out the defect in our system, that is impossible. The impossibility in all the three ways is shown.

kI†zI— myaRdamalMBy àv&Äaya< kwayaimd< Ë;[mu´m!, ik< àma[adIna< sÅvm_yupgMy %É_ya< vaid_ya< àvitRtaya< kwaya<, %t AsÅvm_yupeTy, AwEken sÅvmpre[asÅvm¼Ik«Ty.

On what basis (rule) did you refer to the defects in a dialog which is taking place? Is it in the dialog taking place between both the parties (defendant and opponent) who accept the existence of the pramaana etc. Or is it in the dialog accepting the non-existence. Or in which one accepts the existence and the other the non-existence (of pramana etc).

We three possibilities in any type of dialog with respect to the pramana: 1. Both accepting 2. Both not accepting and 3. One accepting and the other not accepting.

na*> A_yupgtàma[aidsÅv< àit @ta†zpyRnuyaeganvkazat!, iÖtIye Svtae=PyapÄe>, n t&tIy> twEv kwaNtrSyaip às´e>,

Not the first, for the one who accepts there is no possibility for this kind of defect. In the second, even one will have the defect. Not the third, since there is a similar possibility in other dialogs too.

  1. Both accepting – since both accept there cannot be the defect of non-acceptance in any one of them.
  2. Both not accepting – if we show the defect in the other, since one is not accepting to the same defect will be common.
  3. One accepting and other not accepting – Since ithe dialog has started about the acceptance and non-acceptance. Similar dialog on other subjects too can be started.

%Éya_yupganuraeixTva½ kwainymSy, ANywa SvaiÉàaymalMBy tenaip TvÖcis yiTkiÂÖagaTmin Ë;[e=iÉihte kSy jyae Vyvitótam!, àma[a_yupgNturev yaviÚymÉryÙ[a mhtI Syat!,

A dialog is always dependent / based upon both the parties. Otherwise, (if one shows defects from ones standpoint) the other will also show defects in your verbal transaction with reference to one’s own idea, then who will be decided as the victor. And for the one accepting the pramaana etc there will be the more trouble.

If everyone shows defect fromw one’s own standpoint there can be no decisive winner or loser. If one says 1+1=2 and the other says after A it is only B and not C. There can be no winner or loser, even if both are correct, the defect pronounced has nothing to do with the others statement.

The greater trouble for the one accepting the pramaana etx is, he has to find a way to establish the validity in accepting the pramaana etc and also should remove the defect pointed out by the other party.

tSmat! àma[aidsÅva_yupgmaEdasINyen Vyvharinymen smy< bdœXva àvitRtaya< kwaya< Évted< Ë;[mu´imTyuictmev twasit Syat!, yae=ym! Évan! SvaiÉàaymip navxariytu< z²aeit ËrtStiSmn! praiÉsNxanavxar[àTyaza,

Therefore without being bothered about accepting the existence of the pramaana etc one should form the rule for the dialog, then the defect established by you (if we do not accept the pramaana etc, then there can be no verbal transaction) will be proper. When you are not capable of understanding your own viewpoint, expecting you to understand out (vedantins) viewpoint is highly improper.

The defect he imposed upon us (or anyone for that matter) is possible, only if we are not bothered about the existence or non-existence of the pramaana etc, and not in the other three types of dialog as shown earlier.

Since the opponent thought we do not accept the existence of pramana, and not what we said, that we should not be bothered about the existence or non-existence of the pramana etc for starting the dialog.

Aw vadIk«Ty ÊvERti{fk< tiSmÚupaxaE baxaE=iÉxIyte #Tyev ne:yte iZa:yadyStu tSy kwanixkar< }aPyNte,

Supporting: Now, we do not say that we show the defects in the dialog where there is a bad vaitandik (follower of vitanda form of dialog),  but to teach our own disciples his ineligibility in the dialog.

We (vedantins) negated the logicians idea of the defect in the dialog where the pramana eetc is not accepted, giving choice. For this the logiacian replies, holding to the final straw, we are not showing the defects of dialog in the dialog where the opponent is someone like you where the opponent is as ruthless as you. But to expel the doubts in the mind of the disciples, about the dialog regarding the people who do not accept the existence of pramaana etc.

For proving this idea, he brings in the statement from Bhasya, here Bhasyhakara doe not mean Sri Shankaracharya ji, but Sri Prashastapada ji who commented upon te nyaya sutras.

At @v Égvan! Éa:ykar> – s àyaejnmnuyu´ae yid pitRpa*te #Tyah Sm n tu àitpa*se #t!,

This is the reaspn Bhagavan Bhashyakara (commentator), if he is seen to refer to an idea, and not as you refer.

The idea here is, the vaitandika acoording to the sutra is “svapaksha-sthaapana-heena” (one who does not establish his own idea). Therefore, to him if someone asks what is your idea, if he says anything in answer, even if it be “i am a vitandavadi”, then he looses the status of being the vitandavadi. The point being made here is Sri Prashastapada ji refers to the vitandavadi in third person “pratipadyate” and not in second person “pratipadyase”.Thus the choice accepted by you to refute us is not proper.

But, here irrespective of this defect, we see the Author explain the salient features of the vedantins position, even accepting this form of defect on himself, shows his great compassion. This can also seen as (not negating his great compassion) the latter form of logicians accept the vitandavadi too to express his views, but he should not follow it up with some proofs, to establish the ideas.

mEvm! iz:yadIn! àTyip cavaRkadedaeR;ae=yimTyEvaiÉdatVym!,kw< c twa Syat! tSy kwaàveznaàveznyae> tÓaxa]mTvat!, kwayamev ih in¢h>,

Refuting: Not so. Because even to the disciples you can only tell that these are the defect in the [hilosophies like Charvaka etc. And how is that possible, since it does not have the eligibility to negate his right in the dialog. Since only in a dialog there can be victory (refuting).

The idea is even if be accepted for argument sake, the teaching is for the disciples, outside of the dialog. Still, what use can that be of, since it is useless any which way. If the opponent is eligible, negating his eligibility is a defect. And if the opponent has no eligibility there is no need for you to teach these things, since he is not going to use this logic anywhere. Whichever way, the logic is useful only in a dialog, which he can never enter into.

naip iÖtIy>, twa ih – SyadPyev< yid kwkàvtRnIyvaGVyvhar< àit àma[adIna< hetuta  tTsÅvan_yupgme invteRt, n Tvev< sMÉvit twa sit tTsÅvan_yupgNt¨[a< vGVyvharSvêpmev n in:p*te heTvnuppÄe>,

Refuting: The second choice (accepting pramaana etc as the cause) too is not correct. Since – Even if it be accepted that for the parties (defendent and opponent) to enter into a verbal transaction, on non-acceptance of the existence of the pramaana etc, is negated. But this does not happen so, if it be so then for the people who do not accept the pramaana etc there cannot be any verbal transaction (the effect), since there is no cause.

Though our position is different from the Madhyamika, since we though accept the pramaana etc, but do not accept its existence, since for us vedantins, nothing other than the Self is eternal (has existence).

%´ScaymwaeR yNma*imkaidvaGVyvhara[a< Svêpaplapae n zKyt #it,

This was said earlier (just because existence of pramaana etc is not accepted) the maadhyamika Buddhist verbal transaction cannot be completely negated.

After giving four choices, when we spoke about the “vaak-stambana-mantra” (the mantra to keep our mouth shut), we ridiculed, fearing this Chaarvaaka Guru Sri Brihaspati, or Maadhyamika Guru Nagaarjuna or Vedantins Guru Sri Bhagavan Bhashyakara Shankaracharya ji. did not speak.

Aw mNyse kwkVyvhar< àit hetuTvat! àma[adIna< sÅvm! sÅva½a_yupgm> yTst! td_yupgMyte #it iSwteirit,

Supporting: Therefore if you accept, being the reason for the verbal transaction between the parties the existence of the praamana etc, and due to its existence its acceptance, since that which has existence should be accepted.

Here the logician implies two syllogories: Praamana etc has existence since they have a cause and pramaana etc should be accepted since they have existence.

The rule of the world too states that whatever has existence is accepted and whatever is otherwise (non-existent) is not accepted.

mEvm! kyaip inymiSwTya àv&Äaya< kwaya< kwkvaGVyvahr< àit hetuTvat! àma[adIna<  sÅv< sÅva½a_yupgmae Évt àsaXy>,

Refuting: No so. This can be said so only in the dialog where both the parties accept the existence of pramaana etc as the rule for the dialog. If the pramaana etc exists they should be accepted.

If we accept the existence of the Pramaana etc as the rule for the dialog, then there will be defect of interdependence. Only if the pramaana etc are accepted the dialog can start, and only in that kind of dialog the pramaana etc can be accepted.

And in a dialog since the pramaana etc are accepted as its cause, through it you may accept it too. Still, since in the dialog proving the existence of the praamana etc, there will be defect of non-existence or non-acceptance and as this dialog is done to prove the existence the other dialogs can be done too without pressurising the others to accept the existence.

kwat> pUv¡ tÅvavxar[< va prprajy< va=iÉlpÑ(a< kwkaBya< yavta ivna=iblipt< n pyRvSyit tavdnuraeÏVym!,

Before the dialog starts, whatever is the basic (bare) necessity for both the parties to establish their ideas, without which it conclusive knowledge or victory is not possible, only that much should be accepted.

t½ VyvharinymsmybNdadev Öa_yamip ta_ya< sMÉaVyte #it Vyvharinymsmymev b×It>,

And that desired result can be possible by fixing the rules for the dialog, for both of them, this is why both decide upon the rule for the dialog.

s c àma[en tkeR[ c VyvtRVy< vaidna, àitvaidna=ip kwa¼tÅv}anivpyRyil¼àit}ahaNya*Nytmin¢hSwan< tSy dzRnIym!,

And that rule for the dialog is of the form – One (defendant or opponent) should try to establish his idea through pramaana (means of right knowledge) and logic. And the other (opponent or defendant) to should also show the defect of short fall like negation of one’s standpoint etc through wrong knowledge than the accepted said.

Kathaa-Tattva-Gnaana – the knowledge accepted (declared) as the part of the dialog as to be one’s philosophy that needs to be proven or the method one will accept to negate the other. Since, sometimes people accept to negate the others philosophy only through their own philosophy, and sometimes through any other philosophy.

Viparyaya – contradictory to that which is declared. If this is pointed out the dialog ends then and there in favour of the one who points out, This is called as Pratigna-haani – negation of the declared idea.

t™uTpadne àwmSy ɼae VyvhtRVy>, ANywa iÖtIySyEv, ta†zetraE jet&tya VyvhtRVyaE, àamai[k> p]StaiÅvktya VyvhtRVy> #Tyaidêp>,

If the other is able to re-establish the negated idea, then the first one should be declared as loser. Otherwise the other (either the defendant or the opponent). The other (than the loser) should be declared as the victor. The one with the logical one will be accepted as the conclusion.

Here understanding the loser ab=nd the victor is little tricky. Let us say, if the defendent wants to prove 1 + 1 = 3 and the opponent shows the error in this then the opponent wins. But for some reason, the opponent is not able to disprove this, and then the defendant will have to be declared the victor. Though this may not be the logical conclusion.

This may be true even in the case of defendant saying 1 and 1 is 1 and the opponent proves this to be wrong by saying 1 and 1 is 2, still since the defendant has resorted to the deceitful logica, will say, 1 and 1 in binary is 1, since binary is either 1 or 0.

At @v VyvharinyasmybNxe=ip hetuvR´Vy>, twa c sae=ip kwaya< àv&ÄayamiÉxatu< yu´ #it àma[sÅvhetuTviÉxanvt! àTyvSwanmnvkazm!,

Supporting: This is why we should accept the samaya-bandhaa (rule of the dialog) too as a cause (in a dialog).And that too can be understood only when we enter into a dialog for establishing it, therefore as said for the acceptance of the pramaana etc here too we will have interdependence (or we should start the dialog without the rules.

Öa_yamip vaid_ya< ivcaràv&Åya AiÉlPyma[tÅvVyvSwajymUlTven VyVharinymSy SveCDayEv pirg&hItÅvat!,

Refuting: Since both the defendant and the opponent accept the dialog as the means to gain their desired result of establishing the philosophy or the victory, they decide upon the rules for the dialog according to their interest.

Since the rules for the dialog is acceptable for both the parties, we need not establish it through another dialog as in the case of the acceptance of the pramaana etc.

n cEv< àma[anup}SveCDamaÇpirg&hItmUlTvat! mUlapirzuiÏsMÉven svRivcarivcayR)livPlvapiÄ> Syat!,

Supporting: But then, since without resorting to the pramaana (any proof), since the rules for the dialog is accepted according to one’s own desire, its root is not pure (not valid), therefore the whole of dialog, its knowledge and the result will be baseless (defective)

Like the tree with a defective root will only produce a defective fruit, likewise, the defective cause will produce only a defective effect.

And this also will be like the keyword used while hypnotizing. The hypnotizer sys “when it is said ‘good’ or clap you wake-up slowly”. Now, if anyone says the word ‘good’ one will achieve the desired result. Here in a dialog, i will fix a rule, if i say cheers, i win.

Aiv*mana=naidparMpyaRyatSy laekVyuTpiÄg&hIts<vadSy c tSy ANywaÉavasMÉaVytal][Svt>isÏpirzuiÏTvat!,

Refuting: Gained through the tradition without a beginning and from the worldly knowledge (transaction) which cannot be negated and this is self-established through the world and is completely valid.

The tradition of the learned accept this and the world also accepts this kind of desire propelled rules for the dialog, since they are result producing, whether it be victory or the conclusive knowledge.

n c àma[aid sÄapITwmevaeÉa_yam¼IktuRmuicta ta†zVyvhar maÇe[Ev kwaàv&ÅyuPpÄe>,

àma[aidsTva_yupgme=ip twaivxVyvharinymVyitreke tÅvin[RySy jySy va=iÉli;tSy kwkyaerpyRvsanat!,

Supporting (doubt): But is should not be said, the existence of the pramaana etc too can be accepted in this very manner by both the parties

Refuting: Because even without accepting it, there is the possibility of the dialog even if the rules are set as said earlier. On the other hand, even if the pramaana etc are accepted, without the aforesaid rules, there is not possibility for the parties to come to a conclusion about the conclusive knowledge or the victory.


Next the author starts with the third choice, lokavyavahaarasiddha – accepted by the world.

naip t&tIy>, laekVyvharae ih àma[laekVyvharae va Syat! pamraid saxar[Vyvharae va,

Refuting: Therefore the third too is not right. By worldly acceptance what is said the learned worldly transaction or the illiterate’s general worldly transaction.

na*> ivcaràv&iÄmNtre[ tSy ÊinRêpTvat!, tdwRmev pUv¡ inymSy gve;nat!,

It cannot be the first (learned worldly transaction), because without entering a dialog it cannot be proven, and only for that dialog we are searching for the proper rules.


naip iÖÄIy> zrIraTmvadInamip twasit Évta SvIktRVyTvapatat!,

It cannot be the second (illiterate’s transaction), then you should have to accept their idea of body to be the Self.


The materialists (Charvaaka) accept the body as the Self, and the illiterates too accept the Self as the body etc and not as different from it.


píat! tiÖcarbaXytya na_yupeyteit cet!,

Supporting: We do not accept it (body as Self) because it gets negated later by the inquiry (dialog).


Though it may be true, that the others accept the body etc as the Self, but upon inquiry on the Self, in different dialog on this subject we negate this idea.


tihR àma[adyae=ip yid ivcarbaXya ÉivZyiNt tda na_yupeya @v ANywa tu %pgNtVya #it laekVyvharisÏtya sÅvm_yupgMyte #it tavÚ Évit,

Refuting: Then if the pramaana etc too if is negated by the inquiry (dialog) then they too should not be accepted, otherwise it should be accepted. Still, as it is accepted through the worldly transaction we should accept the existence of the pramaana etc, is not proven.


From the previous standpoint, if something is not proven through the dialog, or if something is disproven in a dialog, then it should not be accepted.


naip ctuwR>, ya†z Évta àma[adINy_yupgMy Vyvharinym> kwayamalMByte tSyEv àma[aidsÅvanusrr[aedasInErSmaiÉrPyvlMbnat!, tSy yid ma< àit )laitàsÃkTv< tda Tva< àTyip sman> às¼>,

Refuting: It cannot be the fourth also. As you accept the existence of the pramaana etc as the rule for the dialog, so too we accept being not bothered about the existence or the non-existence of the praamana etc. If there is a problem for us in gaining our desired result (victory or conclusive knowledge) you too will be in the same situation.


The fourth is the acceptance of pramaana etc for the conclusive knowledge or the victory. The four are : 1 concomitance 2. Reason 3. Worldly acceptance and 4. For victory or conclusive knowledge.


The idea is – in accepting of the existence of the pramaana etc, one has to first prove it and not just that because of it he will be bound therefore will face the defect. But for the vedanti, since he is not for or against in acceptance of the pramaana etc, his task is easier and does not face any defect.


Syadett! – inytvaGVyvhari³yasmybNxen kwa< àvtRyta=ip VyvharsÄa A_yupgNtVya, n ih sÄamn_yupgMy Vyvhari³ya=iÉxatu< zKya, i³ya ih in:padna Ast> sÔƒptaàap[imit yavdœ, Supporting:  Fine let it be. Even for one who enter the verbal transaction you are up to enter accepting the rules for the dialog, should accept the transactional reality. For, without accepting the existence one cannot enter the activity of (verbal) transaction. Since the activity is to create, is to bring the non existence to existence (give existence to non-existence)


Here the opponent wants the vedanti to accept the cause-effect relationship between the acceptance and the dialog, which we have already negated, earlier in the second choice.


àma[EVyRvhtRVyimit inymbNxn< àmakar[ÉavSy inymaNtraÉavat! inytpUvRsÅv< kar[Tv< àma[anamnaday n pvRSyit, Ë;[ana< caiStTven ɼavxar[inymbNxen saxna¼VyaÞyadIna< sÅven tiÖ;ySy tÅvêptaVyvharinymnadaE c k{Qae´mev tSy tSy sÅvm¼Ik«timit ir´imdmuCyte àma[adInam! sÄamn_yupgMy kwarMÉ> zKyte #it,

Supporting:  Similarly in the rule we laid for the dialog the statement “we should transact through the pramaana”, the pramaana is included in as one of the cause.Cause is that which has the definitive existence prior to the effect, and this (effect – dialog) cannot take place without accepting the pramaana etc. And since there are rules formed that if the defects exist, the party afflicted by it loses and there is the concomitance through which the rules based on the existence (of the pramaana, defects) are explicitly said. Therefore, what was said here, that without accepting the existence the dialog can take place, is useless statement.


Here the cause – effect relationship is explained. Cause is accepted to be something that has definitive existence prior to the effect. Like the existence of clay, potter’s wheel, stick or the potter. And the cause can be either material or the instrumental cause. Though we have the existence of the donkey used for carrying the clay, or potter’s son playing / crying, the cloud above etc, they are not a must for the effect; therefore they do not come in the causal state.


mEvm!, @iÉrip baxkE> kwayamarBxayamev AiÉmtSy àsaxnIyTve pUvaeR´baxaya AinSttarat!,

Refuting:  Not so. Through these defects too one can establish the desired idea (existence of pramaana) only after entering a dialog, therefore the aforesaid defects have no utility.


n c VyvharinymSy SveCDaSvIk«tSyEv àma[aidsÄaSvIkarpyRvsaiytya nay< dae;> Syat!, yt> sÄa}anSy tÇa¼Tvm! n tu sÄaya>,

Supporting:  As said earlier, we accept the desired rules for the transaction, through which we accept the existence of the pramaana etc, therefore there is no defect.

Refuting:  Cannot be said, since the desire propelled only proves the knowledge of the existence and not the existence per say.


When we discussed earlier about the rules for the dialog, it was said, the rules are formed keeping both the parties desired goal, whether it is conclusive knowledge or victory, in sight. Therefore, if this is so, we are free to accept the existence of the pramaana etc, even without entering a dialog for establishing this.


Therefore there can be no defect as said earlier, of accepting it before or after, if before the pramaana is not established yet, if it is after the dialog then the other dialog too can function likewise without accepting the existence.


Here even if it be accepted by fancy, still that only proves the knowledge of the existence and not the existence.


tÇ ik< sÅvavgmmaÇat! sÄa=_yupgMyeit mNyse Abaixtat! tdvgmaÖa n tavda*> mémrIickadaE jlêptasÑava_yupgmàs¼at!,

Refuting:  Now what do you accept, just by the knowledge of the existence do you accept the existence or through the knowledge that is not negated. It cannot be the first, for even in the mirage water, one should accept the existence of the water.


We give two choice in accepting the existence : 1. Is it just by the knowledge of existence or 2. Knowledge of non-negated existence.


iÖtIye=ip ik< vaidàitvaidmXySwmaÇSy tSyaip kwakalmaÇ @v baixtavgmaÉavat!, Awva kSyicdip kalaNtre=ip c baixtbaexivrhat!, na*> Aitàs¼at! pué;ÇyavgtSyaip @k]navgtSy pué;aNtre[ tenaip ]naNtre b÷l< baXyTvdzRnat!, n casaE AwaeR=sTyae=ip iÖÇaidpué;amaÇpUv¡jattTàtITynuraexat! baxdzRne s<jate=ip twEv siÚTy_yupgMyte, tSmadœ iÖtIy> p]> piriz:yte yÇ svRàkare[ baixtTv< naiSt tTsidTy_yupgNtVym!,

Refuting:  In the second too. Is it that during the dialog decided by the defendant, opponent, and the judge? Or is it in any different time when the knowledge of it being negated is not known to anyone.

It cannot be the first, since there will be defect. Since even if it understood by these three people in a moment, is seen to be negated by somebody else or by them in a different moment. And it is not possible to accept which is non-existent as existent with respect to the knowledge of the accepted three or four people, even after it being negated. Therefore the second choice remains, where there is no negation of any type possible should be accepted as existence.


When three people, the defendant, the opponent, and the judge, decide about something during the dialog. Later gets disputed or negated by someone else, or by the very same people who accepted it in the first place. There are a lot of examples to establish this fact, like the sun revolved around the earth so on and so forth.


It is said too, some intelligent fellow may establish something, but always some other more intelligent one will refute it (prove it to be otherwise). AdvaitaSiddhi by Sri Madhusudhana Saraswati was written condemning Nyayamrta of Sri Vyasa Tirtha, though contained beautiful logic, was condemned by Tarangini which was again condemned by Sri Gauda Brahmananda Saraswati.


tidTw< yid nam vaidàitvaidmXySwmaÇSy Ë;[aidsÄavgm> kwakalmaÇe tErbaXyman> kwa¼Tvena_yupeyte tda ikmayat< svRàkarabixttTsÅvavgmayÄtTsÄa_yupgmkwa¼tan¼IkarSy, kitpyàitpt&kitpykaltwaTvavgmadev àaye[ laEikkae Vyvhar> àtIyte ta†zcay< sÅvagm> kwa¼m!,

Refuting: Therefore thus, even if the defendant, opponent and the judge in their own dialog accept the existence of the pramaana etc as a part of the dialog, so what, since its non-negated knowledge is not gained by everybody in every situation therefore even if it not accepted as a part of the dialog there is no harm. The worldly transaction is seen in things when in general it is seen by some people for a period of time. And this acceptance of existence too is similarly accepted as a part of dialog.


@tÄÊCyte – VyvhairkI— àma[aidsÄamaday ivcararMÉ #it, tSmadœ ya†zVyvharinym> k«t> tNmyaRda Anen nae‘<i¼teit yÖaidvaGVyvhare mXySwavgm> s ivjyte ySy tu vcis tSyavgmSytSy prajy> yÇ va*u´in¢hsÅvavgm> s ing&hIt> tidtrStu n tweTyaidinym @v kwarMÉay ¢aý>,

Refuting:  This is the conclusion. We start the dialog accepting the existence of the pramaana etc in the transactional reality. Therefore, whatever be the rules of the transaction which were set, if judge does not see one overstepping it in the dialog he wins and in one whim that (overstepping) is seen he loses. And where the faults pointed by the opponent is found to be true then the other loses, and (wherever that is disproven the other one wins) wherever the knowledge of it (faults) are not seen he does not loose. Only these rules are to be accepted to start a dialog.

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