Na jnanaprayuktaavasthithisamanyavirahapratiyogitwang hi jnananivartatwam
In order to refute the arguments of the Madhvas, MadhusudanaSaraswatiji explains “jnananivartatwa”. Jnanaprayukta means the application of knowledge, avasthithi means state of existence, samnayaviraha means general absence, pratiyogi means adjunct. So jnananivartam means through the application of knowledge, the state of general existence is negated and it becomes the adjunct of general absence. If the term “jnananivartam” is accepted in this way, then there is no error in the definition.
Avasthithi or existence is of two types. One is it on nature-swarupen and the other is its casual state-karanatmana. According to sankhya and advaita Vedanta, the effect remains in a latent state in the cause, even before creation.
This is called satkaryavada. According to this view all creation is simply manifestation. So when the pot is of the clay it is karanatma
tatha cha mudgarpatenghatsyasarupenavashtivirahaapikaranatmanaavasthithivirahabhavat
So when the stick and stone destroys the pot, though its form is destroyed the pot exists in its causal state as potsherds or clay. So, total sublation does not take place, as is true for mithya objects which are completely sublated by knowledge.
The causal state of an effect can never be sublated by any other means except through brahmajnana. So no error of ativyapti exists here.
In the same way, there is no siddhasadhanadosha, in the case of purvajnana which gets terminated by uttarjnana. This is because just as in the previous case, the purvajnana remains in its causal state.
n ava viyadadoubrahmajnannashyatweapitadvadevmithyatwasidhyaarthantaramuttarjnanenlinasyapurvajnasyswakaranatmanaavasthanatavasthithisamanyavirahaanupapatti
No charge of arthantarata (proving something not intended) should be brought against this definition of falsity from the perspective of space etc. Space can be only be negated through Brahman-jnana and nothing else. Through the uttarjnana the purvajnana has been negated, but still the purvajnana is not totally destroyed. Purvajnana (like that of a pot) leaves athought imprint, samaskara, that thought imprint indicates that the purvajnana exists in the casual stae. The revered author thus says,avasthithisamanyavirahaanupapatti- no absolute absence can thus be invoked (except through brahmajnana).
However, a doubt may be raised whether mithyatwalakshana would incorporate asat objects like sasha-vishana-hare’s horn within itself. This is because avisthisamnyaviraha-genral absence of existence is there (both in causal and manifested state). Thus one may have a doubt of ativyaptidosha here. But, MadhusudanaSaraswatiji negates this by saying that there is no jnanaprayuktatwa here-one does not have to apply knowledge to understand the non existence involved innhare’s horn, whil knowledge of locus is required to understand the non existence of mithya objects.
Sadhyavikalatadosha is not applicable here. On the mother of pearl, the illusion of silver is created. There exists an arthakriyakaritwaa –transactional ability in that silver, and so one has to accept the existence of silver, when it is being perceived-pratitikale. The vyavaharika silver is the cause which causes its desire and prods people to rush for it. So, until there is vadhakjnana there is an apparent existence of silver, and without that vadhakjnana this silver cannot be negated. However, in case of hare’s horn here is total absence and we do not need vadhakjnana for it. Thus, no sahyavikalatadosha exists here.
AtaevauktangVivaranacharyai- “ajnasyaswakaryenpravilinenvartamanenvasahajnanennivrittivadha” iti.
In this context revered Vivaranacharya, says what is badha-sublation. Ajnansyaswkaryensaha- when ajnana along with its effects that exists pravilinen- in the past, vartamanen-present and future (vartamana here is to be understood to indicate present and future) gets eradicated, then it is called vadha.
This is also supported by Sureshwaracharya:
Through the mahavakyas like tatwamasi , the right knowledge that takes place destroys instantly (at the same moment) avidya and its effects that exists in all the three periods of time.
“sahakaryennaasit” itilinenekaryenshanivrittiabhiprayem; “sakaryennabhavishiyati” ititubhavikaryanivrittiabhiprayem, itianyatatet. Rupyaupadanamajnanenswakaryenvartamanen linen vas aha adhisthansakshatkaratnivartate.
“sahakaryennaasit” the present knowledge after it dawns eradicate the ignorance that exits not only in the present, but also erradicatdsthe ignorance of the past. “sahakaryennabhavishiyati” it also eradicates the future karya of ignorance. (Basically past present and future are all imagined through ignorance). This can be explained through an example. The karya of ajnana is the silver superimposed. The superimposed silver that exists in all the three periods of time gets eliminated when there is adhisthansakshatkara-knowledge of the locus-mother of pearl.
Tattwarupyaupadanamajnananangbhedabhyupagamatitinadrishtantesadhyavaikalyammudgarpatanantarangghatonastiitipratitivatadhisthanjnanatarangghatonastiitipratitivatadhisthanjnanantarangshuktyjnangtadgatrupang cha nastiitipratitesarvasammatwat.
Ajnana is negated by the immediate knowledge of adhisthana-this is what is accepted by the advaitin. This does not mean that knowledge of any particular locus like that of mother of peal would give realisation y destroying ignorance. Ignorance is accepted to be multiple. There is ignorance for pot, cloth etc. There is no trouble in the example of the nature of sadhyvaikalya. The knowledge should eradicate ignorance but for the same item ignorance can be many and so at the sameplace there can be ignorance.
After the pot is destroyed by a stick or stone, we have the cognition that there is no pot. Similarly when the knowledge of mother of pearl takes place, the cognition risesthat there is no silver. The advaitin accepts anirvachaniyakhyativada, while the logicians accept anyathakhyativada and others have their own khyativada. However, that the knowledge of locus implies the superimposition vanishes is accepted by all- sarvasammatam.
Even if jnananivatawa is accepted asjnantwavyapyadharma then there is no error.
Uttarjnasyapurvajnannivartakatwangna cha jnatwavyapyadharmenkintuicchadisadharanenudichyatmaisheshagunatwenudichitwenvaitinasiddhasadhanadi.
The Madhvas had pointed out that jnantwavyapya dharma exists in uttarjnana that negates the purvajnana. However, this is not true. There is no jnanatwavyapya dharma here, but the desire, hatred which arises in the mind (that prods us) as attributes of self that causes the uttarjnana to negate the purvajnana.
Napiicchadinivartyasmritenajnannivartasamskareativyapti, smrittenasmritesamskaranivartakatwamanabhavat.smritou hi jatayangsamsakaradrirhabhavatiitianubhavasiddhamteyangdrirataratwang cha samanvishyaksamskaraankatwamitiadosha.
Now the dualist once again raises the issue of memory. Though it can be accepted that jnantwavyapya dharma is not there in case of uttarjnana but, according to the dualist it is definitely there in memory. Also it is accepted that smriti negates samaskaras. MadhusudanaSaraswatiji refutes this charge. Remembrance cannot be destructive of samaskaras. “Smriti is that which negates samaskaras” – there are no means of right knowledge to prove this. However it is proved by our experience that smriti strengthens samaskaras (instead of destroying them). One actually strengthens one’s thought imprint by repeated knowledge which is memory. This is what He says-drirataratwang cha samanvishyaksamskaraankatwam.
Vastastusakshatkartwenjnannivartawangvivakshityamatanapurvaktadosha. Napinischayetwenjnatwavyapyadharmenjnnnivartasamsayaativyapti, itisarvamavadatm.
MadhusudanaSaraswatiji says that the whole point of this discussion was to refute the views of the dualist school. However, in actuality,what is accepted by jnananivartatwa is neither jnantwavyapya dharma or jnanatwen but only accept sakshatkaren-the knowledge of the locus. So say, in nischayajnana-determined knowledge there is a doubt. The doubt is negated by the strength of knowledge and not by sakshatkara -knowledge of the locus. So the definition does not unduly extend to doubt.
Here the discussion on the third definition of falsity ends.
The fourth definition of falsity is given by Chitsukhacharya. The fourth definition is very similar to the second definition. It may seem that only words have been changed, but that is not true.