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AdvaitaSiddhi – Lecture 4 – Part 2

Posted by on March 2, 2016

The revered author now justifies the importance of the two other adjectives “sattwen pratiti arhang “ and “chidbhinang”
Itera visheshanadwayang tu tucha brahmini cha vadhvaranya adarniyameva
What happens if we use only the term ”brahmajnaiteraabhadhya” ? Then the paksha will be defined over both Brahman and the asat (like sky-flower). Sattwen pratitiarhang negates tucha/aleek/asat which never becomes an object of knowledge as paksha. If only “brahmajnanaiteraabhadya” is used, then since asat is also negated through a cognition that is different from akhandkara vritti , there would be no restriction of considering it to be the paksha . However , the debate between the dualist and the Advaitin is regarding the falsity of the empirical world. The term “chidbhinang” implies that the paksha does not include Brahman. If this term is not used , then since Brahman also appears as existence in all our cognitions, thus it would also be implied by the term”sattwen pratitiarhang”
(Mithyate vishesh vipratipatti)
It is thus established that mithyatwa of this empirical world is to be proved. However, instead of taking the entire world as the paksha, someone may proceed to take individual entities like earth , fire , water etc to be the paksha, where mithyatwa is to be determined. Keeping this view in the forefront Acharya Madhusudana Saraswatiji says:
Prateang va vipratipatti-“viyat mithya na va” prithvi mithya na va iti.
Viyat means akash/space.Instead of the earlier vipratipatti statement which indicated the entire empirical world as the paksha of the inference regarding mithyatwa the viprati[patti statement is of the form : is akasha mithya or not? Or is earth mithya or not? Even if the five elements are taken individually and doubt is expressed regarding the falsity of each, then also there is no problem for the advaita position.
The purvapakshi wants to bring “sandhigdhaaneykantika dosa” in this context. However this “sandhigdhaaneykantikadosha” is a different logical fallacy from the fallacy denoted by the same term in the navya-nyaya system of thought (and also in the advaita system). According to the logicians “sandigdhaaneykantika dosha” is when there is sadhya abhava nischaya coupled with a doubt about the hetu. Sadhya abhava nischaya means when one is sure that the sadhya does not exist there (say fire in a lake) , however one develops a doubt regarding the presence of hetu (smoke).Nyayamritkara reverses this idea. According to him, even if there is a doubt regarding the sadhya but clarity regarding the hetu, it should be termed as “sandhigdhaaneykantika dosa”. It is clear , that this cannot be a very logical position , because if one proceeds in the way Nyayamritakara prescribes even in a valid anumana, this dosha will linger.
Thus it is said
Abang viyadade pratekangpakshatwaapi na ghatadou sandhigdhaaneykantika, pakshasamtwat ghatade.
Madhusudana Saraswatiji says, even if pot etc are considered to be the place of inference (paksha) the allegation of sandhigdhaaneykantika dosha cannot be charged. As Dhidhitikara points out, there can be no difference between the paksha and the pakshasama(of the order of the paksha i.e. the pot etc)
The position is further clarified:
Tatha hi pakshe sadhyasandheasaya anugunat pakshabhinya ava tasya dushanatwang vachyam
Since sandhigdhaaneykantika dosha can only be charged in places which are other than the paksha (and not pakshasama), the presence of doubt regarding the sadhya is actually helpful (anugunat) for the process of inference . Thus the Nyayamritakara cannot bring this charge of sandhigdhaaneykantika dosha either in the paksha or in the pakshasama
The position of the logicians is also clarified:
Ataeva uktang”sadhyaabhavanischayvati hetusandhea eva sandhigdhaaneykantika” iti
Hence it has been accepted by the logicians that when at the place/entity where there exists a definite (not tainted by doubt or error) knowledge that the sadhya is not present , if at that place a doubt rises regarding the hetu corresponding to that sadhya , then one should accept sandhigdhanaeykantika dosha
Then what is pakshata?
Madhusudana Saraswatiji says:
Pakshatwang tu sadhyasandheytattwang sadhyagocharsadhakmanabhavatwang va
Paksha , in the next sloka has been described in the next sloka in two ways: sadhyasandheytattwang and sadhyagocharsadhakmanabhavatwang . Earlier it has been explained that pakshatwa is “sandgidhasadhyavan pakshatwang”, the place where doubt exists regarding the sadhya is paksha. Gangesha Upadhaya says that paksha is “sisadhisavirahasahakrita sadhaabhava”. This definition however does not contain any word that signifies the necessity of doubt (regarding the sadhya) in the paksha.Thus, one could argue (see previous discussion) that Vipratipatti statement is redundant in a debate and so on. Thus Madhusudana Saraswatiji defines pakshata as “sadhyasandheytattwang” .Thus He incorporates the idea of doubt and defines pakshata as a place where doubt regarding the sadhya exists. He again gives another alternative definition of paksha “sadhyagocharasadhakmanabhavatwang” which is nothing but “sisadhisavirahasahakrita sadhaabhava”. The place which has absence (prior to the inference) about the ascertainment of the thing to be inferred(sadhyavishayak siddhi ) is pakshata.
Aetat cha ghatadisadharanam Ataeve tatraapi sandhigdhaaneykantikatwang na dosha, pakshasamatyauktustu pratigavishayatwabhavamatrena
Since this definition of pakshata is valid in case of worldly objects like pots etc, hence one cannot argue that there is sandhigdhaaneykantika dosha , even if these objects are considered as the place of doubt(regarding falsity). The only reason that pots etc are considered as the pakshasama and not paksha , is because that the pratigya-vakya mentions space / earth as the place of doubt (Is space mithya or not? ) and not pots. The doubt however exists in the latter also, and thus it is termed as pakshasama.
The next sloka is:
Na cha tarhi pratijnavishayatwameva pakshatwam, swarthanumane tadbhavat.
Here the revered author says , one should not accept that to be pakshata which is introduced in the pratijna vakya(the introductory statement declaring the aim of the five point syllogism). This is because inference itself can be of two types :swarthanumana, done for one’s own sake and parathanumana, done for convincing others. It is generally accepted by the logicians that only the second kind of inference requires the five point syllogism. The first kind of inference , since it is done for one’s own sake destroy doubt immediately by understanding the hetu directly.
This is the place where the first chapter ends. In the next discussion , the idea of vimatam is introduced.vimatam means vipratipatti-vishisisitam i.e.here the revered author takes not the paksha but the pakshata-avacheddaka(any place which is endowed with the pakshatwa) and proves it to be false.

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